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Psychology of Morality
Abstract
Five questions regarding the nature of the moral sense, the origin of conscience, the
development of morality, variability in the moral sense, and the relation of morality to behavior
are examined from the point of view of four theoretical approaches (psychoanalytic theory,
social learning theory, cognitive-developmental theory, and evolutionary psychology). In
addition, some concepts and findings from outside the four approaches are also touched
upon. The moral sense is shown to be complex, comprising cognitions, feelings, and
behaviors. The theoretical approaches disagree regarding the issues of whether conscience
directly reflects social teaching, or is constructed by the developing individual. They also
disagree on whether moral development is incremental or stagewise. Explanations of
individual, gender, and cultural differences in morality differ across the four approaches. None
of the approaches explains the relation of behavior to morality; rather, application of social
psychological theories is suggested.
This article is available in Online Readings in Psychology and Culture: http://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/orpc/vol2/iss1/6
INTRODUCTION 
Questions of human morality have been among the most vexing in all of psychology. The 
moral sense is so ubiquitous that its lack is regarded as a pathological condition, but its 
bewildering complexity and variability across persons, situations, and cultures has 
thwarted efforts to construct a comprehensive psychological theory of morality. This essay 
will attempt to summarize the main theoretical approaches and issues vying for place as 
explanations of morality, and will touch briefly on some of the important empirical findings. 
Definitions 
There is no single agreed-upon definition for the term "moral" in the psychological 
literature. However, as a practical point of departure, let us make use of an adapted 
version of a dictionary definition: morality consists of the rules of conduct based on 
conscience or the sense of right and wrong. This definition immediately presents us with a 
number of psychological (and sociological) questions. 
 
1. What kind of "sense" is the moral sense? What does it consist of? 
2. How do we know right and wrong? Where does conscience come from? That is, where 
do we get our knowledge of the rules and our feelings about them? 
3. Does our moral sense change over time? If so, how and why? 
4. Do all people have the same "sense" of right and wrong?  
5. If not, how does it differ, both across individuals and across cultures? What accounts 
for the variation? 
6. To what extent do individuals behave according to their sense of morality? 
 
It is in the attempt to answer these and related questions that psychological theories of 
morality have been formulated. In general, four approaches have dominated the field of 
morality: (1) Freud's psychoanalytic theory; (2) learning theories, including social learning 
theory; (3) cognitive-developmental theory; and (4) evolutionary psychology. Some 
workers in the field, however, are not closely identified with any of these approaches. The 
following will summarize the main answers that have been proposed, along with some of 
the principal arguments for and against them, taking each of the above questions in turn. 
Aspects of morality 
Asking what kind of "sense" the moral sense is leads directly to further questions, such as, 
is it knowledge of the rules, or feelings about right and wrong actions, or use of the rules to 
guide actual behavior? The fact that each of these questions appears to require an 
affirmative answer implies a complex structure for conscience, a structure comprising (at 
least) cognitive aspects such as knowledge and reasoning, moral feelings, and action or 
behavior. While all the major theories of morality try to address all these aspects to some 
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 extent, each of them takes a different aspect as seemingly the most basic. The 
psychoanalytic theory of the superego focuses to a large extent on the moral feelings of 
anxiety, shame, and guilt, generally ignoring cognitive and behavioral aspects (Freud, 
1924a, 1924b). Social learning and behaviorist approaches place greatest emphasis on 
behavior, its consequences (direct or vicarious), and its stimulus conditions, to the relative 
exclusion of thinking and feeling (e.g., Bandura, 1977). Cognitive developmental theory is 
concerned mainly with moral reasoning, to the relative neglect of feeling and action (e.g., 
Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1932). Evolutionary hypotheses, to the extent that they take into 
account subjective states of the person, focus on feelings as cues to action; however, this 
approach has so far concentrated on the selective value of prosocial action and the 
possible mechanisms by which both prosocial tendencies and social control tendencies 
may have been selected through evolution (e.g., Trivers, 1971). An important exception to 
the tendency to focus on a single aspect is the work of Hoffman (2000), whose theory ties 
multiple aspects of morality together using the concept of empathy, and is not easily 
classifiable into any of the other approaches. 
In some ways, the psychoanalytic approach has been a cornerstone for other types 
of research, in that the capacity for moral feeling, particularly guilt, has been regarded as a 
crucial indicator of the existence of conscience. However, the theoretical basis of 
conscience in the working out of the Oedipal conflict has left the theory open to attack by 
anthropologists who question the universality of the Oedipal conflict (e.g., Malinowski, 
1961); by learning theorists who see no need to posit unconscious motivational processes 
as the basis of moral learning; and by feminist theorists who reject Freud's assertion that 
males develop a stronger conscience than females because of differences in the way they 
experience castration anxiety. On the other hand, by grounding conscience in a 
specifically sexual conflict, psychoanalytic theory is closer than other psychological 
theories to popular conceptions that focus especially on sexual morality. 
Social learning theorists have demonstrated convincingly that children imitate social 
models' prosocial and aggressive behaviors, and there is abundant evidence for the 
conditioning of anxiety. However, the learning approach has had difficulty in accounting for 
other moral feelings (shame and guilt) or for age-related changes in moral reasoning and 
judgment. On the other hand, learning theory postulates no essential content for moral 
rules, and is thus comfortable with the extreme diversity of rules encountered across 
cultures. 
Cognitive developmental theories, particularly those of Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg 
(1969), have shown that moral reasoning, based on the concepts of equality and 
reciprocity, changes in predictable ways across the years of childhood and youth. 
Considerable cross-cultural research indicates that the sequence of stages proposed by 
Kohlberg is invariant, although the existence of all his stages in all cultures is highly 
questionable (Snarey, 1985). This theory, however, has difficulty explaining moral feelings, 
and evidence for a relationship between stages of moral development and actual moral 
behavior is weak. 
Evolutionary psychologists can point to evidence from a variety of sources, from 
ethological studies (e.g., de Waal, 1996) to computer simulations (Axelrod, 1984), that 
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 reciprocity in prosocial behavior confers selective advantages in a group-living species, 
particularly when combined with a tendency to punish defections. Since evolutionary 
psychology posits that feelings are the primary means of inducing adaptive behavior 
(Johnston, 1999), it is open to explanations involving moral emotion and motivation, 
although to date a full account has not been offered. The modular theory of mind 
espoused by many evolutionary psychologists is also potentially compatible with some of 
the ideas of cognitive-developmental theory, but once again, an explicit connection 
between these approaches has yet to be drawn. 
As noted above, Hoffman's (2000) approach accords relatively equal weights to 
aspects of feeling, cognition and behavior, and may be regarded as an attempt to integrate 
the most important insights of the four theoretical approaches. Hoffman's key concept of 
empathy, which he regards as having an evolutionary basis, provides a basis for both 
moral feelings and moral reasoning when combined with cognitive elements supplied by 
social experience, particularly inductive disciplinary encounters. 
The Source of Morality 
Theorists of several persuasions unite in asserting that conscience originates outside the 
individual, in societal influences. Psychoanalysis pictures the origin of the superego as a 
process of incorporation, almost literally a "swallowing" of the parent's morality by the 
child. Although the child's motivation for adopting adult morality is seen to lie in the internal 
conflicts of the Oedipal stage, the moral sense itself is thought to be imported from the 
outside. 
Learning-based approaches likewise posit environmental pressures, in the form of 
models, reinforcements, and punishments, as elements that govern the acquisition of 
conscience. Both of these theories share the term "internalization" as a description of the 
origin of conscience, and both contrast internalized conscience with control of behavior by 
outside agencies, such as parents or police. To a large extent this model of internalization 
is also shared by most sociologists and anthropologists, whose concept of socialization 
includes the acquisition of morality under the tutelage or pressure of socializing agents 
such as parents, teachers, and religious leaders. Even social constructionist theorists, who 
emphasize the uniqueness of cultural meanings, implicitly assume that the individual's 
morality stems from the culture. 
Cognitive-developmental theory takes exception to this dominant model, arguing that 
the child essentially creates his or her own conscience on the basis of experience with 
relationships and role-taking opportunities. This approach maintains that, just as the child's 
thinking and use of logic develop through several stages, so moral reasoning moves 
through stages that are progressively more complex and inclusive in scope. For cognitive-
developmental theory, the child does not simply take in or internalize an external morality, 
but rather produces his/her own moral understanding by constructing and re-constructing 
concepts of reciprocity and equality. Thus, in contrast to the internalization theorists, 
Kohlberg is able to posit a post-conventional or principled morality in some individuals 
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 which may transcend the conventional morality presented to them by their social 
surrounding. 
Evolutionary psychologists see morality as an inherited facultative trait - or, more 
likely, a set of such traits - activated by particular kinds of social conditions and 
experiences. In this sense they are close to the cognitive-developmental position but in 
even more distinct opposition to the internalization model. Their assertion that morality is 
part of the evolutionarily selected nature of humans has occasioned a great deal of 
excitement among researchers, but as of this writing much remains to be clarified in terms 
of specifying what sorts of conditions can be expected to lead to which outcomes, and 
why. 
Hoffman's model appears to be eclectic in respect to the question of the origin of 
conscience. In his account of moralization, he makes use of both internal cognitive and 
emotional dynamics in the child as well as inductive reasoning and other disciplinary 
techniques applied by parents, and although he makes frequent use of the concept of 
internalization, he also credits the child's inherent and developing capacities for empathy 
and reasoning as important factors. 
Development of the Moral Sense 
All of the approaches under discussion here agree that conscience develops over time; 
but, as is true in other domains of development, one of the most persistent debates is over 
the question of whether morality develops in an incremental, additive fashion or in a series 
of distinct and incommensurable stages. 
The concept of stage-wise development is embraced by a majority of the theoretical 
approaches. Psychoanalytic theory sees the formation of the superego as a watershed 
event in the development of personality, so that the child is a fundamentally different entity 
after the superego develops. Thus a different set of stages (pre- and post-superego) is 
superimposed on and partially coincides with the psychosexual stages that are thought to 
lay the basis for adult personality. As noted above, cognitive-developmental theory 
proposes a set of stages in the development of moral reasoning, ranging from the 
"premoral" through the "conventional" and possibly through "postconventional." Hoffman 
offers a set of stages for the development of empathy and also refers to internalization in 
stage-like terms. 
Each of these stage theories, however, has a unique view of what the stages consist 
of, how they are different from one another, and at what ages they emerge. Freud's 
superego development is seen as occurring in early childhood, certainly by the age of 
seven, and the change consists essentially in the child's internalizing the rules of morality, 
so that what had previously been a conflict between the individual and society - the conflict 
between gratification of the individual's selfish desires and the needs of social order - 
becomes a conflict within the individual. 
Piaget described the major moral stage transition as taking place in late childhood, 
and it consisted of moving from a "heteronomous" view of social rules to an "autonomous" 
one, in which the child could adopt other points of view and see the rules as his/her own. 
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 Kohlberg extended this early formulation to include adolescence and early adulthood, and 
maintained that each stage consisted of a unique conceptualization of the requisites of 
social interaction, with each successive stage exhibiting greater cognitive complexity and a 
greater range of perspectives taken into account. 
Accounts of moral development based on learning theory do not make use of the 
stage concept, but on the contrary, see the learning of morality as essentially similar to any 
other type of learning. That is, the incremental accumulation of incidents of social 
modeling, reward, punishment, and classical conditioning of anxiety eventually add up to 
the acquisition of morality. From this point of view, there is no necessary direction of 
learning other than a progressively closer approximation to the demands of the social 
surrounding. Although in practice changes in morality might not be expected in adults, 
theoretically speaking, changes in moral learning could take place at any time in life in 
response to new contingencies of reinforcement. 
Evolutionary psychology has not yet taken a stand on the question of whether moral 
development occurs in stages or incrementally. 
Differences in the Moral Sense 
The problem of differences in the moral sense is actually several different problems - 
individual differences, gender differences, and cultural differences, to name only the most 
frequently discussed. Not every theoretical approach tries to account for all of these types 
of difference, but each of them is the subject of lively debate. 
Individual Differences 
Individual differences have been conceptualized in terms of severity of conscience 
(Freud), degree of internalization (Hoffman), and stage attainment (Kohlberg). 
Freud's somewhat paradoxical proposal was that severity of conscience is inversely 
related to the severity of punishment experienced by the child, explaining this 
phenomenon on the basis of greater motivation to incorporate the rules represented by a 
more loving, less punishing parent. Much later, cognitive dissonance theorists took up this 
theme, suggesting that "insufficient external justification" for obeying the rules leads the 
child to produce his/her own internal justification, i.e., a belief in the rightness of the rules 
and his/her obedience (see Aronson, 1999). 
Learning theory approaches have no need of a special explanation for individual 
differences in morality: each person has a unique learning history, which in turn will 
produce variation across individuals in terms of morality. 
Hoffman's approach ties most individual differences in moral internalization and 
capacity for guilt to differences in disciplinary style of the parents (and to some extent 
other socialization agents). In particular, he sees a power-assertive, punitive style as 
inimical, and an inductive style of discipline as conducive to moral development. When 
using inductive discipline, the parent calls the child's attention to the negative 
consequences for others of the child's bad behavior, mobilizing both empathy for others 
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 and recognition of responsibility for his/her own actions. This in turn facilitates the child's 
development of guilt and self-regulation. 
Cognitive-developmental theory attributes most individual differences in morality to 
differences in stage attainment. Such differences could be due to age or to the (lack of) 
role-taking opportunities that have been encountered by the individual. 
Since evolutionary psychology conceptualizes morality as a set of facultative traits, 
differences across individuals would be explained as primarily a result of differences in the 
environmental circumstances encountered, possibly in a cumulative fashion. Ironically, this 
view leads the two most opposite theories, evolutionary and learning psychology, to take 
very similar positions on this question, at least on a superficial level, although evolutionary 
psychology does posit some constraints on the possible forms that moral rules may take. 
Gender Differences 
Gender differences are clearly predicted only by Freud's psychoanalytic theory, which 
maintains that the greater intensity of castration anxiety experienced by males leads them 
to develop a stricter conscience and greater capacity for guilt. However, this prediction has 
not fared well in empirical research. Using criteria such as obedience, confession of 
transgression, apparent guilt, and atonement for transgression, observations of young 
children have typically produced the opposite result: young girls show more signs of 
internalization of conscience than young boys. 
Another debate over gender differences in morality was sparked by findings from 
some studies using Kohlberg's moral reasoning interviews with adolescents and adults 
that males tended to be placed in higher stages than females. Gilligan (1982) asserted that 
this tendency actually reflected female use of what she called a care perspective, in 
contrast to the justice perspective embodied in Kohlberg's theory and measurements. 
Later research has shown that both males and females make use of both perspectives, 
depending on the circumstances. Also, surveys of the literature have shown that males 
and females do not generally have different placements on Kohlberg's stages; if anything, 
there is a tendency for females to have higher scores on some measures of moral 
reasoning (e.g., Moon, 1986). However, the identification of the care perspective has 
added a new dimension to psychological concepts of moral reasoning, and it has been 
important in some of the cross-cultural debates. 
Cultural Differences 
Cultural differences in the rules of morality are so large and pervasive that cross-cultural 
psychologists debate whether they are differences of degree or of kind. Shweder and his 
colleagues (e.g., Shweder, Mahapatra & Miller, 1990) have denounced Kohlberg's 
cognitive-developmental theory as applying only to Western societies with individualistic 
social forms and liberal values. Along with other researchers, they have demonstrated that 
some of the criteria for moral judgment employed in some collectivistic cultures outside of 
western cultural traditions are not anticipated in Kohlberg's scoring system and may, they 
contend, erroneously lead to artificially lower placements for respondents who use them 
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 (see also Snarey, 1985). These criteria bear a close resemblance in some cases to the 
"care" ethic proposed by Gilligan. 
The critique offered by social constructionists is, however, more fundamental than 
simply a criticism of a particular theory; its main point is that each culture is unique, with its 
own meanings and moral system, so that comparison is in a real sense impossible. They 
stand alone on this point, however. All other theories of morality have at least some 
universalistic elements. 
Psychoanalytic theory posits little in the way of universal moral content, other than a 
prohibition on incest. However, the mechanism of internalization, rooted in the 
fundamental conflict between the desires of the individual and the requirements of social 
life, is seen as universal. As noted above, this assumption has been challenged by 
ethnographers. 
Social learning theory also posits no particular moral content, but the processes of 
internalization (learning) are regarded as essentially the same in all humans. Cognitive 
developmental theory, in contrast, implies that both the processes of moralization and the 
bases of moral judgment, as they reflect basic and universal psychological processes, 
should be similar in all cultures. The wide cultural differences that are empirically observed 
are explained either on the basis of a distinction between morality and convention (Turiel, 
1983) or on the basis of restricted role-taking opportunities in isolated cultural groups 
(Kohlberg, 1969). 
Evolutionary psychology also predicts underlying patterns of cross-cultural similarity, 
such as the norm of reciprocity which is found universally (Gouldner, 1960). In addition, 
this approach makes a number of predictions about the possible forms of rules governing 
sexual behavior, in this respect bringing it closer to psychoanalytic theory than to the other 
approaches. The modular model of mental processes allows the evolutionary approach to 
deal with multiple aspects of morality, including fairness or justice, care, and sexual 
behavior within a single theory. This affords it an inclusiveness not found in any other 
approach. Although the recent identification of some aspects of moral judgment and self-
regulation in terms of moral values with specific brain areas (e.g., Damasio, 1994) is 
indirect evidence in favor of this approach, a "grammar" of morality still remains to be 
articulated. Ridley (1996) and Haslam (1997) have addressed possible directions that the 
evolutionary theory of morality is likely to take in the near future. 
Behavior and Conscience 
Evidence on this question comes more from social psychology than from work inspired by 
any of the theories of morality. An early study by Hartshorne and May (1929) showed 
clearly that preadolescent children are in full command of moral knowledge - that is, they 
know the rules of morality quite well - but that their adherence to the rules depends heavily 
on the circumstances, in terms of incentives, anonymity, personal goals, and the like. Work 
done within the cognitive-developmental framework also shows only weak connections 
between moral reasoning and behavior (with the possible exception of persons at 
Kohlberg's highest stage; see Kohlberg, 1969 and Haan, Smith & Block, 1968). 
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 Social institutions, including families, appear to share some of the assumptions of learning 
theory, such as that good examples, rewards for good behavior, and punishment for bad 
behavior will serve to increase compliance to the rules of morality. There is some 
laboratory evidence for these assumptions, particularly with regard to prosocial behavior 
and aggressive behavior. On the other hand, the persistence of naughtiness in children 
despite punishment, of crime despite prisons, or even capital punishment, and religiously-
defined sin despite social ostracism or expectations of eternal damnation suggest that 
other contingencies also need to be taken into account. Perhaps chief among these is the 
very definition of temptation: the direct or indirect reward value of the non-compliant 
behavior in comparison to the reward value of compliance. 
As noted above, cognitive dissonance theorists have shown that self-regulated 
compliance with rules is associated with "insufficient" external justification. Batson and his 
colleagues (see Batson, 1991) and Hoffman (summarized in Hoffman, 2000) have shown 
that performance of prosocial acts, or refraining from harmful acts, is facilitated by 
activation of empathy for the other party. Zimbardo (1970) and others have shown that 
anonymity or deindividuation sharply reduces the person's adherence to social or moral 
rules that are ordinarily followed under other circumstances. Self-awareness theory has 
shown that moral rules are more likely to be followed to the extent that they are made 
salient, even in indirect fashion by making the person more self-aware in general (e.g., 
Duval & Wicklund, 1972). Several of these findings are congruent with the more general 
conclusion of social cognitive theorists that consistency between behavior and attitudes or 
values depends to a large extent on accessibility of the attitude, whether it is due to 
priming, frequent use, centrality, or some other factor. 
In summary, knowledge of moral rules, or even ability to reason about moral action, 
appears to have less predictive value for behavior than situational factors such as 
immediate reinforcement contingencies, the social situation (including the social visibility of 
the act and the behavior and expectations of others), feelings such as empathy, guilt, and 
self esteem, and the cognitive salience of moral values. 
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Questions for Discussion 
1. What are the implications for child rearing and educational practices of assumptions 
about whether the origin of conscience is essentially external or internal? 
2. Most psychological investigations of morality have focused on issues of rule following, 
exchange, fairness, and the welfare of the self and others, generally ignoring issues of 
sexual morality. In contrast, popular conceptions of morality tend to focus strongly on 
sexual issues. How can social concerns with the regulation of sexuality be integrated 
with psychological approaches to the study of morality? 
3. Discuss similarities and differences among the moral feelings or emotions of guilt, 
shame, anxiety, obligation, and responsibility. 
4. To what extent is empathy a personal disposition, and to what extent can it be fostered 
by situational factors? 
5. What kinds of evidence would help us to decide between incremental and stage 
models of moral development? 
6. Differences in the moral sense between individuals within the same culture tend to be 
interpreted in terms of "higher" or "lower" levels of internalization, development, or the 
like; however, differences in moral conceptions or practices between cultures tend to 
be interpreted relativistically. Can these two approaches be reconciled? 
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